TOV.WrongfulTermination&Discrimination

Wayne State immune from liabilty for alleged defamatory comments in response to former employee's False Claims Act suit

In Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's summary disposition of the plaintiff's False Claims Act lawsuit.  Kreipke argued that he was defamed by the University's president in a Detroit Free Press interview.  After Kreipke raised allegations of fraud and mismanagement in the University's medical care grant programs, a public investigation prompted the University president to respond. Kreipke argued that the president's response ws defamatory.  The Court found "no evidence of 'malicious intent' "  and granted summary disposition based on governmental immunity.

Police chief's case summarily dismissed by Court of Appeals

In Truchan v. Charter Twp. of Adrian, the former Chief of Police sued the township advisory committee chairman and supervisor for tortious interference with his job and for defamation and invasion of privacy, after the defendant chairman sent memoranda expressing his "concerns" about the plaintiff.  When the chief refused to meet with the committee about the "concerns," he was terminated.  The Court of Appeals judges concluded that since the chairman was a volunteer and acted in good faith and without malice, he was entitled to immunity from the Chief's lawsuit.  The appellate judges also reversed the lower court and granted summary disposition against his claim that the township supervisor had violated the law by creating an employment file for the purpose of encouraging a FOIA request into the Chief's employment.

Court overturns summary disposition in favor of City that unilaterally altered health care benefits

The Harper Woods Retirees Ass'n sued the City of Harper Woods after the City attempted to unilaterally alter health insurance coverage for retirees.  The Court of Appeals noted that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the City and the union did not grant the City an "absolute right" to alter benefits.  The Court sent the case back to the trial judge to evaluate the various contracts applicable to different retirees, so that it could be determined which rights survived the expiration of the CBA.

Government is not immune from retaliatory discharge claims in workers compensation, but this man didn't prove causal connection

In Lucero v. Department of Corrections, the plaintiff sued alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers Disability Compensation Act (WDCA).  In short, the comp doctor said he could return to work with restrictions; and to some extent Lucero's doctors apparently agreed.  The DOC scheduled him back to work and Lucero showed up but twice worked only a few hours before giving up. 

The Court held that government employers are subject to the WDCA provisions forbidding retaliation against comp claimants, but concluded that Lucero didn't warrant protection under this provision because he had not proved a causal connection between his comp claim and being terminated.  The Court ruled that the DOC properly discharged Lucero because he didn't adequately document that he could not work within the restrictions imposed by the comp doctor.  Therefore, the employer was within its rights to fire him.

Accountant who disputed directive to defy "general accounting principles" cannot sue over firing

Roger Burney sued Rose Holt and New St. Paul Head Start after he was terminated as the accountant for the program. He claimed wrongful interference with his contracual relationship and a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).  Holt argued that, as a government actor, she was immune from liability for "tortiously interfering with Burney's business relationship" because she acted in good faith.  The Trial Court rejected her immunity argument but did summarily dismiss the WPA claim. Both sides appealed.

The Court of Appeals relied upon Holt's description of the deteriorating relationship that led to Burney's firing and reversed the trial judge's failure to grant summary disposition.  After describing a several-month-long battle between Burney and Holt over Holt's demand that the books be "balanced" and "closed" each month--a demand that Burney claimed would require him to violate general accounting principles, the Court of Appeals ruled that Holt acted in good faith and was immune from liability.  A lack of good faith would require proof of malicicious intent, and the Court relied upon Holt's explanation to decide that she did not act with malice.  The Court did uphold the trial judge's summary dismissal of the WPA claim.

Wayne County executive loses immunity claim; court refuses to dismiss wrongful termination suit

Turkia Awada Mullin is the highest appointive executive of Wayne County's Department of Economic Development Growth Engine.  She attempted to parlay her position into a claim of absolute immunity from liability for allegedly wrongfully terminating Taylor Segue.

The Michigan Legislature and Supreme Court have delineated a level of absolute immunity for the highest ranking executive at all levels of government.  This is a sad holdover from the English Common Law, under which the King of England refused to recognize any lawsuit against himself in the courts that "he" created and sponsored.  Then it was called "sovereign immunity:" now it is merely one facet of governmental immunity.  How it maintains vitality in a democracy created of, by and for the people is a mystery, and why the victim of governmental misconduct should be singled out and excluded from fair compensation is a mystery to us.

Building Inspector's civil rights and whistleblower protection claims are examined

Vijay Parakh sued the Harrison Township in Macomb County, arguing that he was disciplined in retaliation for doing his job.  He first brought a grievance under the Collective Bargaining Agreement and won reinstatement of his position.  Because that did not provide complete relief, however, he filed the instant action in Circuit Court.  The Defendants secured summary disposition of his action by claiming he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and on other grounds.  He appealed.

The Court of Appeals panel pointed out that Parakh achieved all that he could under the CBA grievance procedure, and therefore a genuine issue of material fact remained with regard to whether the Plaintiff had exhausted his procedural rights.  The Court also pointed out that the Defendants had actually waived this defense by failing to raise it on a timely basis.

Fired Court officer cannot sue to enforce Judge's alleged promises of "just cause" employment.

Kevin Dokes sued the 22d District Court, arguing that Judge Sylvia James induced him to move from Georgia to Michigan to take employment as a court clerk based on a promise of permanent employment so long as he performed his job duties and did not provide "just cause" for firing.  The Defendants argued that "just cause" employment contracts in public service should be void against public policy and that, in any event, Dokes was an "at will" employee who was not induced to move north to take this job.

The Defendants demonstrated that the form identifying Dokes as a "permanent/regular" employee was executed after he had taken the job and was seeking a mortgage.  Similarly, the alleged promises of "just cause" employment were not made in advance of his start date and therefore he could not argue that the statements supported a "promissory estoppel" or inducement claim.

More importantly, even though the panel found that there is no Michigan public policy repudiating just cause employment in government jobs, the judges concluded that Dokes had not overcome Michigan's "presumption" that all workers are hired "at will." It noted prior, recent decisions which have held that even contracts for "permanent" employment are presumed to create "at will" employment such that the employee can still be fired for any reason.  It concluded that Dokes' evidence did not overcome this presumption because it was not "clear and unequivocal." Indeed, the court ruled that the defendants were entitled to summary disposition because the judges decided Dokes' evidence did not create a question of material fact about "just cause" employment.

Court holds that City is immune from police officer's claim for constructive discharge

James Herbert was investigated several times by his own Department in a manner that he charged was a violation of public policy and retaliation against him for asserting his legal rights.  He claimed that the City's conduct made his employment untenable and constituted an illegal "constructive discharge."    The Court held that his claims of retaliation and violation of public policy were not contractual rights, but rather in the nature of "tort" rights, and therefore, whether accurate or not, they could not be enforced:  the City enjoyed governmental immunity from "tort" (or wrongful conduct) claims, and they were not an implied contractual right.

The Court also ruled that the office could not pursue a Whistleblower,  or a violation of the First Amendment "1983" claim.  The Court held that he was required to sue under the Whistleblower Protection Act within 90 days of the City's wrongful conduct--it wasn't enough to sue within 90 days of his constructive discharge. 

Court of Appeals panel overturns trial judge; summarily dismisses wrongful termination claim despite "just cause" provision

Charles Melki sued his employer, Clayton Charter Township in Genesee County, for wrongful discharge.  Melki had been the Chief of Police.  The Township sought summary disposition before trial.  The trial judge granted partial disposition but also found that since Melki had a "just cause" provision in his contract, he was entitled to a jury trial on that issue.  The Township appealed the trial judge's decision, seeking complete summary disposition. Melki cross-appealed the grant of governmental immunity to the Township Supervisor, Bruce Beatty. 

The higher court overturned the trial judge's decision awarding immunity to Beatty, concluding that when he fired Melki, he was acting outside his authority as Township Supervisor.  Therefore it reinstated Melki's claim against Beatty for tortious interference with a contractual relationship.  With regard to the claim against the Township, however, the appellate panel ruled that Melki could not enforce his "just cause" contract protections.