TOV.WrongfulTermination&Discrimination

Former State Senator is granted summary disposition of discrimination claim brought by secretary

Calvert v. Gleason involved a claim by a former State Senator's secretary that she had been promised a job if Gleason won election to county clerk.  She was not hired and filed suit against Gleason and the County claiming race and gender discrimination.  Her case against the County was immediately dismissed and she did not file any appeal of that decision.  Eventually, the judge also summarily dismissed her claims against Gleason.  She appealed that decision.

On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed.  The Court held that Calvert's Elliott-Larson Civil Rights Act claims "lacked merit."  It explained that since Gleason hired a white female and the plaintiff was a white female, she could not argue that gender or race played a role in the employer's decision-making.

Age discrimination claim dismissed; FMLA estoppel claim reinstated

In Tilley v. Kalamazoo Co. Road Commission, the Court of Appeals upheld the summary dismissal of an employee's age discrimination claim.  The Court held that the 59-year old had not provided sufficient proof that his supervisors disliked him because of his age.  The Court did send the case back to the trial court, however, to assess whether the employer should be "estopped" to argue that the Family Medical Leave Act should apply to the man's decision to leave a job site when he had chest pain.  The employee argued that he only left work because the employment manual issued by the Road Commission assured him of the FMLA protections which the Road Commission now argued should not apply.

Dismissed psychologist cannot sue the Department of Corrections

Vaughn Guild was employed by the Department of Corrections to provide counseling to ogroups of sexual offenders and assaultive inmates. He was disciplined for failing to comply with a mandate that a "therapy termination report" for each of the 13 inmates in a group session be filed within five days of the completion of group therapy.  He maintained that the time limit was unreasonable and that it was merely a pretext for his firing.

When he was first dismissed, he filed a grievance and the parties underwent arbitration that ultimately resulted in a compromise settlement.  Before Guild could return to work, however, the defendant "discovered" that Guild had been "falsifying documents" related to treatment, by filing allegedly inappropriate amendments to his reports that could have resulted in negative consequences for treated inmates. On that basis, the DOC fired Guild again, and he sued.

The Court held that Guild could not establish that he was a victim of age discrimination because the chart where he compared his report completion with other psychologists' time compliance did not adequately document the age of the psychologists with whom he was comparing his performance.  While by age, Guild was in a "protected class," he did not establish that the other time-challenged, but undisciplined psychologists were not, apparently.

With regard to his disability discrimination claim, the court held that Guild's testimony establishing the DOC's notice of his sleep disorder was too vague to support a claim, particularly given his "admission" that he didn't consider himself disabled.

City denied summary disposition in age discrimination case brought by employee "too young" to enforce pension obligation

The City of Allen Park's standard employment contract for Police Administrators allowed them to collect their pension benefits without penalty, upon "mutual separation" from service, "regardless of age."  When Deputy Police Chief Gaydos separated, he was denied his benefits because he was under 52 years old and "too young."  He sued, pointing to the express language of the contract, prior payments to the former fire and police chiefs prior to "normal" retirement age, and what he alleged was clear age discimination. 

The City sought summary disposition, arguing that Gaydos was not part of the "protected class" who could sue for age discrimination, because he was under 52 years of age.  The trial judge denied the City's request and set the matter for trial.  The City appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision and sent the case back for further development.

One age discrimination claim is reinstated by Sixth Circuit; another dismissed

A school employee fired by the Tecumseh Public Schools alleged that he was told by the Superintendent that "they just want somebody younger."  Several other statements were made that suggested an age bias, although some were ambiguous.  The Federal District Court dismissed the plaintiff Scheick's case, but the Sixth Circuit reinstated.  It pointed out that while not all of the alleged statements were direct evidence of age discrimination, some were, and collectively they established a question of fact for the jury.

During the same week, in McCarthy v. Ameritech Pub'g Inc., the Sixth Circuit upheld the summary disposition of a second case alleging age and gender discrimination.  The Court agreed in McCarthy that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case.  The Court held that the plaintiff had not shown that the plan to eliminate positions was dscriminatory and had not complied with ERISA foundational requirements to allege non-compliance by the employer.

Age discrimination claim is summarily dismissed

Henry Saad made a clean sweep this week by signing on to a decision that summarily dismssed a woman's age discrimination claim.  He apparently participated in 6 reported cases, and each one was decided in favor of the insurer or employer.  In the instant case, the Court ruled in Titsworth v. Shiawassee Sports Ctr, Inc., that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial on her claim that she was denied a promotion because of her age. 

Despite the fact that the defendant acknowledged that three of the four relevant factors proving age discrimination were met, and despite evidence that the owner refused to consider the applications of the plaintiff and another woman in her 50s, the Court held that she hadn't raised even an inference of age discrimination.

Appeals Court overturns trial judge and summarily dismisses employee's age discrimination claim

 

The Michigan Court of Appeals overturned the local trial judge and summarily dismissed the employee's age discrimination claim in Miles v. City of Bay City.  The judge had rejected summary disposition, finding the City's 10-day suspension of Miles and its' imposition of a "last-chance agreement" leaving Miles on the precipice of discharge, was an "adverse employment action."  Unbelieveably, the appellate court reversed this finding and held that Miles had suffered no "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of his employment."

The City had ruled that Miles breached a "violence in the workplace" rule and imposed the above discipline.  Miles argued that the City's findings and the discipline imposed by the City rendered his employment intolerable and his working conditions unreasonable.  He resigned, arguing that he was the victim of "constructive discharge."  The higher court disagreed and ruled that a jury could not conclude that his resignation was anything other than voluntary.

Federal court reverses summary disposition granted to employer in age discrimination claim

In Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp., the appellate judges upheld the plaintiff's right to a jury trial on his age discrimination claim.  The lower court had granted summary disposition based on the employer's claim that Pierson was terminated as part of a "reduction in force." 

The higher court noted there was ample evidence to suggest that the latter explanation was pretextual and that even the employer's explanation of the termination had changed over time.  Therefore, Pierson had raised a legitimate claim and there existed a material question of fact to be decided by the jury:  was Pierson discriminated against, when he was fired and replaced by a significantly younger individual (age 62 vs. age 47)?

Age discrimination claim is dismissed after worker "failed to prove that younger workers were treated better."

The 59 year old plaintiff in Drazin v. Binson's Hosp. Supplies sued alleged age disrimination after his employment was terminated.  Even though the Defendant conceded that the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the appellate panel upheld the summary disposition of his claim, without a jury determination, concluding that he failed to provide adequate evidence that alleged "customer complaints" were merely a pretext for his discharge.

In an opinion joined by Henry Saad, who virtually never decides in favor of employees or injury victims, the Court held that merely because the plaintiff was almost the oldest person in his department, and replaced (within one day) by a younger worker, he had no basis upon which to seek a judgment that the employer's actions were motivated by age discrimination.

Secretary's employment discrimination case is summarily dismissed

Constance Hensley, the executive secretary in the Romeo Community Schools for about a decade, quit when she allegedly suffered from "inappropriate and derogatory comments" by her supervisor who allegedly shifted work from Hensley to a younger secretary and repeatedly threatened to eliminate her position.  When Hensley targeted the younger woman for lay-off rather than herself, their working conditions deteriorated and Hensley claimed her situation became untenable.  She took a medical leave and applied for workers compensation.  She also complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 

When Hensley was confronted, on return, with new accounting and computer-related tasks, she took vacation time that had not been pre-approved, but rejected an offer that she be placed on long term disability, explaining that she was "not disabled." Ultimately she opted for what she described as "forced retirement" and filed an age discrimination claim.  The trial judge summarily dismissed her claim and on appeal her case was described as "border[ing] on frivolous." The Court held that she failed to connect her employment situation to illegal or discriminatory behavior.